Blending Data-Driven Priors in Dynamic Games


Justin Lidard, Haimin Hu, Asher Hancock, Zixu Zhang, Albert Gimo Contreras, Vikash Modi, Jonathan DeCastro, Deepak Gopinath, Guy Rosman, Naomi Leonard, Maria Santos, Jaime Fernández Fisac
Paper Website

Paper ID 20

Session 4. Field robotics

Poster Session day 1 (Tuesday, July 16)

Abstract: As intelligent robots like autonomous vehicles become increasingly deployed in the presence of people, the extent to which these systems should leverage model-based game-theoretic planners versus data-driven policies for safe, interaction-aware motion planning remains an open question. Existing dynamic game formulations assume all agents are task-driven and behave optimally. However, in reality, humans tend to deviate from the decisions prescribed by these models, and their behavior is better approximated under a noisy-rational paradigm. In this work, we investigate a principled methodology to blend a data-driven reference policy with an optimization-based game-theoretic policy. We formulate KLGame, a type of non-cooperative dynamic game with Kullback-Leibler (KL) regularization with respect to a general, stochastic, and possibly multi-modal reference policy. Our method incorporates, for each decision maker, a tunable parameter that permits modulation between task-driven and data-driven behaviors. We propose an efficient algorithm for computing multimodal approximate feedback Nash equilibrium strategies of KLGame in real time. Through a series of simulated and real-world autonomous driving scenarios, we demonstrate that KLGame policies can more effectively incorporate guidance from the reference policy and account for noisily-rational human behaviors versus non-regularized baselines.